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INTRODUCTION	  Investments	  in	  mitigating	  climate	  change	  have	  their	  greatest	  environmental	  impact	  over	  the	   long-­‐term.	   As	   a	   consequence	   the	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   cutting	   greenhouse	   gas	  emissions	   today	   appear	   to	   be	   weak.	   In	   response	   to	   this	   challenge	   there	   has	   been	  increasing	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  current	  generations	  can	  be	  motivated	  to	  start	  financing	  mitigation	   at	  much	   higher	   levels	   today	   by	   shifting	   these	   costs	   to	   the	   future	  through	  national	  debt.	  Shifting	  costs	  to	  the	  future	  in	  this	  way	  benefits	  future	  generations	  by	  breaking	  existing	  patterns	  of	  delaying	   large-­‐scale	   investment	   in	   low-­‐carbon	  energy	  and	  efficiency.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  this	  chapter,	  it	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  technically	  feasible	  to	  transfer	   the	   costs	   of	   investments	  made	   today	   to	   the	   future	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   people	  alive	   today	   do	   not	   incur	   any	   net	   cost	   (e.g.	   Foley,	   2009;	   Rendall,	   2011;	   Broome,	   2012;	  Rezai	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Rozenberg	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  basic	  idea	  then	  is	  that	  governments	  can	  break	   current	   patterns	   of	   delaying	   mitigation	   investments	   by	   ensuring	   that	   their	  existing	  constituents	  do	  not	  need	  to	  make	  significant	  sacrifices.	  	  	  The	   normative	   argument	   that	   we	   should	   finance	   mitigation	   by	   ‘borrowing	   from	   the	  future’	   can	   be	   advanced	   in	   two	   general	   ways.	   The	   first	   is	   based	   on	   the	   empirical	  prediction	  that	  we	  will	  continue	  to	  see	  a	  pattern	  of	  very	  weak	  motivation	  among	  current	  generations	  to	  accept	  short-­‐term	  mitigation	  costs.	  Thus,	  unless	  it	  becomes	  economically	  beneficial	  over	   the	  short-­‐term	   to	  markedly	   increase	   investments	   in	   low-­‐carbon	  energy	  and	   efficiency	   we	   should	   not	   expect	   to	   see	   sufficient	   investment	   to	   avoid	   dangerous	  levels	  of	  global	  warming.	  On	  this	  view	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  to	  future	   generations	   is	   an	   imperfect	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  weak	  moral	  motivation	  today	  but	  much	  better	  than	  the	  status-­‐quo	  (Broome,	  2012,	  37-­‐48).	  On	  the	  second	  view,	  because	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  expect	  that	  people	  in	  the	  future	  will	  be	  wealthier	  than	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people	  today	  (at	  least	  over	  the	  next	  century	  or	  so)	  and	  because	  the	  benefits	  of	  mitigation	  largely	   benefit	   people	   in	   the	   future,	   passing	   on	  most	   of	   the	   costs	   of	  mitigation	   to	   the	  future	   is	   actually	   a	   fair	  way	   to	   distribute	   these	   costs	   (Rendall,	   2011).	   Notice	   that	   the	  second	  view	   is	   not	   dependent	   on	   the	   empirical	   premise	   that	   people	   today	  will	   not	   be	  motivated	  to	  make	  sufficient	  short-­‐term	  sacrifices,	  although	  the	  problem	  of	  motivating	  the	  present	  will	  give	  additional	  support	  to	  the	  argument	  for	  redistributing	  costs	  to	  the	  future.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	   focus	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  first	  approach.	  Specifically,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	   chapter	   is	   to	   take	   seriously	   the	   possibility	   that	   climate	   change	   has	   produced	   an	  extremely	  intractable	  political	  problem	  and	  that	  we	  must	  now	  consider	  strong	  measures	  that	  can	  break	  existing	  patterns	  of	  delaying	  mitigation.	  I	  defend	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  climate	  change	   involves	   a	   stark	   conflict	   of	   interests	   between	   current	   and	   future	   generations,	  then	   borrowing	   from	   the	   future	   would	   be	   both	   strategically	   and	   normatively	   much	  better	  than	  the	  status	  quo.2	  	  However,	  I	  nevertheless	  challenge	  the	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	   proposal	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   it	   is	   not	   in	   fact	   the	   powerful	   tool	   for	  motivating	  existing	   agents	   that	   its	   proponents	   imagine	   it	   to	   be.	   The	   purpose	   of	   developing	   this	  critical	   argument	   is	   not,	   however,	   simply	   to	   throw	   doubt	   onto	   the	   idea	   of	   borrowing	  from	  the	  future.	  	  	  Debt	   financing	   climate	   mitigation	   is	   a	   form	   of	   intergenerational	   buck-­‐passing.	   In	   the	  climate	   ethics	   literature	   this	   type	   of	   buck-­‐passing	   is	   usually	   viewed	   as	   deeply	  objectionable.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  normative	  theorising	  about	  climate	  governance	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  institutional	  reforms	  that	  better	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  generations	  and	  inhibit	  buck-­‐passing.	  My	  ultimate	  concern	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  cannot	  limit	   prescriptive	   normative	   theorising	   about	   climate	   governance	   to	   these	   types	   of	  reforms.	   If	   we	   really	   do	   find	   ourselves	   in	   a	   political	   context	   where	   the	   prospects	   for	  effective	   action	   are	   very	   poor	   then	   strategic	   forms	   of	   buck-­‐passing	  may	   also	  make	   an	  important	   positive	   contribution	   to	   avoiding	   dangerous	   global	   climate	   change.	  Consequently,	  if	  debt	  financing	  is	  not	  as	  powerful	  of	  a	  motivational	  tool	  as	  imagined	  we	  still	  have	  strong	  reasons,	  I	  will	  argue,	  to	  identify	  other	  strategies	  that	  will	  change	  agents’	  incentive	  structures.	  To	  this	  end	  I	  propose	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  passing	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  to	  the	  future	  that	  warrants	  consideration.	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  The	   chapter	   is	   organised	   into	   five	   sections.	   Section	   I	   accounts	   for	   why	   motivating	  existing	  agents	   to	   invest	   in	   climate	  mitigation	   is	   taken	   to	  be	   such	  a	  difficult	   challenge.	  Section	   II	   defends	   the	   view	   that	   borrowing	   from	   the	   future	   can	   be	   normatively	  justifiable.	  Section	  III	  explains	  how	  it	   is	  thought	  to	  be	  possible	  to	  dedicate	  significantly	  more	  resources	  to	  mitigation	  today	  without	  current	  agents	  experiencing	  this	  as	  a	  cost.	  	  Section	   IV	   challenges	   the	   idea	   that	   borrowing	   from	   the	   future	   is	   a	   powerful	   tool	   for	  motivating	  the	  present	  to	  invest	  in	  mitigation.	  Section	  V	  proposes	  that	  we	  consider	  the	  development	  of	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  explicitly	  pre-­‐committing	  the	  future	  to	  mitigation	  costs.	   I	   defend	   this	   type	   of	   governance	   instrument	   at	   a	   normative	   level,	   specifically	  against	  the	  objections	  that	  it	  is	  1)	  a	  form	  of	  tyranny	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  future	  and	  2)	  morally	  corrupt.	  	  	  
I	  -­‐	  THE	  WICKEDNESS	  OF	  TIME	  IN	  THE	  ANTHROPOCENE	  The	  capacity	  of	  the	  atmosphere,	  the	  oceans,	  and	  other	  natural	  sinks	  to	  safely	  carry	  GHG	  emissions	  is	  a	  global	  common	  pool	  resource.	  The	  mitigation	  of	  climate	  change	  is	  a	  global	  public	  good.	  We	  currently	   find	  ourselves	   in	   familiar	  conditions	  of	  unsustainable	  use	  of	  common	   resources	   and	   under	   provision	   of	   public	   goods.	   However,	   these	   cooperative	  challenges	  appear	  to	  be	  unusually	  difficult	  in	  the	  case	  of	  global	  warming.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  because	   of	   the	   large	   number	   and	   variety	   of	   actors	   that	   need	   to	   be	   coordinated	   and	  because	  of	  the	  scale	  and	  influence	  of	  special	  interests	  in	  the	  fossil	  fuel	  sector.	  In	  addition,	  there	   is	   some	   divergence	   between	  where	   the	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	  will	   be	  most	  severe	   and	   which	   countries	   must	   bear	   the	   greatest	   mitigation	   costs.	   We	   are	   also	  currently	   lacking	   a	   leading	   state	   with	   strong	   incentives	   to	   act	   unilaterally	   and	   to	  coordinate	   other	   states.	   The	   high	   cost,	   complexity,	   and	   technological	   uncertainty	  involved	  in	  reforming	  our	  economies	  is	  another	  commonly	  highlighted	  obstacle.	  Yet,	  of	  all	  these	  impeding	  factors	  it	  is	  the	  role	  of	  time	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  toxic	  feature	  of	  this	  political	  problem.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  paper	  Hansen	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  estimate	  that	  it	  takes	  100	  years	  to	  see	  60-­‐90	  per	  cent	   of	   the	   warming	   response	   associated	   with	   GHG	   emissions.	   Long	   time	   lags	   in	   the	  climate	   system	   between	   emissions	   and	   temperature	   responses,	   between	   temperature	  stresses	  and	  damaging	  environmental	   consequences,	   and	  between	  effective	  mitigation	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policies	   and	   substantial	   infrastructure	   reform	  create	   a	   situation	  where	   investments	   in	  mitigation	   make	   little	   difference	   to	   the	   climate	   damages	   agents	   will	   experience	   over	  their	   lifetimes.	   It	   is	   past	   and	   probable	   on-­‐going	   emissions	   that	  will	   have	   the	   greatest	  effects	  on	  current	  generations.	  From	  a	  game	   theoretic	  perspective	   this	  means	   that	   the	  relevant	   agents	  do	  not	   share	   in	   a	   preference	   for	   the	   collectively	   cooperative	   outcome	  compared	   to	   the	   collectively	   non-­‐cooperative	   outcome.	   The	   consumption	   interests	   of	  people	   alive	   today	   are	   best	   promoted	   by	   not	   mitigating	   climate	   change.3	  In	   a	   more	  typical	   commons	  problem	   it	   is	   the	   agents’	   preferences	   for	   the	   collectively	   cooperative	  outcome	  that	  can	  be	  leveraged	  to	  establish	  norms	  and	  institutions	  that	  allow	  individuals	  to	  escape	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  dynamics	  (e.g.	  Ostrom,	  1990).	  	  In	  the	  climate	  case	  there	  is	  no	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  between	  generations.	  Rather	  the	  central	  problem	  is	  to	  motivate	  existing	  agents	  to	  invest	  in	  protecting	  the	  commons	  for	  future	  agents	  (Gardiner,	  2001).	  	  As	   time	  moves	   forward	   and	   irrespective	   of	   the	   climate	   conditions	   each	   generation	   is	  born	   into	   the	   same	   problem	   of	   weak	   incentives	   will	   be	   present	   (Gardiner,	   2001).	  Overcoming	   the	   intergenerational	   structure	   of	   the	   problem	   requires	   that	   agents	   be	  motivated	  by	  the	  interests	  of	  others	  (i.e.	  future	  agents)	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  than	  is	  true	   for	   agents	   in	   typical	   collective	   action	   problems.	   Norms	   of	   fair	   reciprocity	   may	  simply	  not	  be	  enough.	  Importantly,	  if	  we	  can	  redress	  the	  intergenerational	  motivational	  obstacle	  we	   can	   still	   face	   a	   typical	   global	   public	   goods	   problem	   between	   states.	   Even	  more	   importantly,	   as	   time	   passes	   the	   costs	   of	   mitigation	   increase,	   environmental	  damages	   increase,	   and	   the	   amount	   that	   has	   to	   be	   invested	   into	   adapting	   to	   climate	  change	   increases	   (Vaughan	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Luderer	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Rogelj	   et	   al.,	   2013).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  passing	  of	  time	  has	  the	  real	  potential	  to	  create	  a	  positive	  feedback	  where	  delay	  breeds	   stronger	  and	  stronger	   incentives	   for	   further	  delay	   (Shue	  2010,	  Gardiner,	  2011,	  pp.	  185–209).	   	  The	  assessment	  above	   is	  not,	  of	   course,	  an	  attempt	   to	  give	  a	   full	  account	   of	   individuals’	   or	   political	   communities’	   motivations	   or	   to	   depict	   how	  individuals	  and	  groups	  have	  actually	   responded	   to	   climate	   change.	  The	  account	  above	  aims	   only	   to	   describe	   key	   obstacles	   to	   effective	   climate	   politics	   that	   can	   help	   us	  understand	   why	   the	   world’s	   states	   have	   yet	   to	   invest	   in	   mitigation	   in	   a	   way	   that	  responds	  to	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  threat	  and	  why	  the	  politics	  of	  climate	  change	  appear	  so	  intractable.	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II	  -­‐	  GIVING	  THE	  FUTURE	  A	  CHANCE	  TO	  PAY	  If	  the	  incentives	  for	  passing	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  climate	  change	  to	  future	  generations	  are	  very	  strong,	  one	   response	   is	   to	   try	   to	   identify	  ways	  of	  passing	  on	   these	  costs	   in	  a	  way	   that	  best	   serves	   the	   interests	   of	   future	   generations.	   This	   is	   the	   core	   idea	   behind	   debt	  financing	  of	  climate	  change	  mitigation.	  Let	  us	  assume	  for	  now	  that	  we	  can	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  to	  the	  future	   in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  produce	  an	  improvement	  for	  these	  future	  agents	  compared	  to	  business	  as	  usual.	   	  Our	  terms	  of	  negotiation	  with	  the	  future	  are	  only	  possible	  because	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  of	  domination	  over	  them.	  We	  are	  free	  to	  ignore	   the	   fact	   that	   continuing	   to	   pollute	   the	   atmosphere	  will	   undermine	   the	   climatic	  conditions	  for	  human	  wellbeing	  far	  into	  the	  future.	  Thus,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  disingenuous	  to	   claim	   that	   we	   are	   somehow	   helping	   the	   future	   by	   letting	   them	   pay	   for	   mitigation	  when	  it	  is	  our	  actions	  that	  are	  putting	  them	  in	  danger	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  This	  assessment	  has	  strong	  normative	  force,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  strong	  strategic	  and	  normative	  arguments	  for	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future.	  	  	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  expect	  political	  inertia	  to	  continue	  or	  worsen,	  identifying	  a	  no-­‐cost	  option	  that	  could	  bring	  about	  immediate	  and	  significant	  mitigation	  investment	  while	  at	  the	   same	   time	   improving	   conditions	   for	   all	   the	   relevant	   agents	   leads	   to	   a	   very	   good	  outcome	   compared	   to	   perpetual	   delay	   (Broome,	   2012,	   43-­‐48).	   However,	   this	  improvement	  on	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  hardly	  a	  second-­‐best	  option.	  Finding	  ways	  to	  bring	  the	  interests	  of	  present	  people	  and	   future	  people	   into	  better	  alignment	  or	   finding	  ways	   to	  better	  mobilise	  the	  concern	  for	  future	  people	  current	  generations	  already	  have	  appear	  to	  be	  much	  more	  normatively	  attractive	  options.	  Thus	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  failures	  to	  engage	  seriously	  in	  efforts	  to	  spread	  more	  climate	  friendly	  preferences	  or	  to	  make	  the	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  public	  policy	  more	  salient	  in	  political	  discourse.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  if	  	  climate	  change	  is	  the	  most	  difficult	  cooperative	  challenge	  humanity	  has	   ever	   faced	   this	   difficulty	  must	  make	   some	  difference	   to	   our	  moral	   assessments	   of	  current	  failures	  to	  act	  and	  of	  strategies	  to	  address	  these	  failures.	  	  	  The	   development	   of	   highly	   productive	   economies	   driven	   by	   the	   exploitation	   of	   cheap	  and	  abundant	  energy	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  the	  amazing	  improvements	  in	  human	  welfare	   over	   the	   past	   two	   centuries.	   Individuals,	   companies,	   and	   governments	  both	  have	  had	  and	  continue	  to	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  using	  fossil	  fuels.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	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finding	   ways	   to	   transition	   to	   low-­‐carbon	   economies	   is	   straining	   the	   capacity	   of	   our	  economic	   and	   political	   institutions.	   Investing	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   present	   has	  traditionally	  and	  continues	  to	  pass	  on	  enormous	  benefits	  to	  future	  people.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  investing	  in	  shared	  goods	  today	  can	  undermine	  human	  welfare	   far	  off	   into	   the	   future	   it	  also	  becomes	  clear	   that	  we	  are	  straining	  the	  ability	  of	  our	  systems	  of	  morality	  to	  continually	  improve	  on	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  	  The	  point	   is	  not	   to	  deny	   that	   it	   is	  deeply	  problematic	   that	  we	  are	   failing	   to	  dedicate	  a	  small	   fraction	   of	   current	   wealth	   to	   protecting	   the	   conditions	   for	   human	   welfare	   for	  generations	   to	   come.	   However,	   we	   must	   also	   acknowledge	   that	   climate	   change	   is	   a	  system	  level	  problem	  similar	  to	  other	  system	  level	  problems	  in	  capitalist	  economies	  that	  are	  not	   intended	   and	   for	  which	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   assign	  moral	   responsibility.	   From	   this	  perspective,	  taking	  on	  long-­‐term	  debt	  to	  finance	  low-­‐carbon	  infrastructure	  for	  the	  future	  is	   in	   part	   a	   moral	   failure	   but	   also	   in	   part	   a	   system	   level	   response	   to	   a	   system	   level	  problem,	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  deficit	  spending	  to	  redress	  the	  effects	  of	  boom-­‐bust	  cycles	  is	  a	  system	  level	  response	  to	  the	  vulnerabilities	  capitalist	  economies	  generate.	  	  	  	  We	  really	  do	  find	  ourselves	  in	  conditions	  of	  political	  delay	  with	  no	  sense	  of	  how	  or	  when	  these	  patterns	  might	  be	  broken.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  a	  strategic	  and	  normative	  case	  for	  at	  least	   some	   significant	   borrowing	   from	   the	   future.	   In	   fact	   the	   proposal	   raises	   the	  following	  question,	   if	  we	  can	  solve	   the	   largest	  environmental	   threat	   to	  human	  welfare	  without	  anybody	  having	  to	  give	  up	  anything	  then	  why	  don’t	  we?	  Is	  it	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	   it	   is	   because	   we	   have	   simply	   failed	   to	   notice	   the	   options	   available	   to	   us?	   In	   the	  following	  section	  I	  explain	  how	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  to	  finance	  climate	  mitigation	  is	   technically	  possible.	  However,	   in	   section	   IV	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  not	   surprising	   that	  we	  have	  not	   yet	  used	  debt	   financing	   to	  pay	   for	  mitigation.	  This	   is	   because	   the	  borrowing	  from	   the	   future	   proposal	   does	   not	   adequately	   address	   how	   costly	   it	   would	   be	   to	  compensate	  the	  current	  generation	  to	  the	  no-­‐sacrifice	  level.	  	  
III	  -­‐	  WHAT	  DOES	  THE	  FUTURE	  HAVE	  TO	  BARGAIN	  WITH?	  	  If	  we	  only	  have	  access	   to	   resources	   in	   the	  present	  how	  can	  we	  direct	   these	   resources	  towards	  mitigation	  without	   this	   being	   perceived	   as	   a	   cost	   today?	   To	   achieve	   this	   the	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  we	  can	  1)	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  savings	  we	  make	  for	  the	  future	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and	   2)	   change	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   consumption	   bundles	   we	   will	   enjoy	   over	   our	  lifetimes	  (Broome,	  2012,	  37-­‐48).	  These	  changes	  in	  how	  we	  save	  and	  what	  we	  consume	  can,	   it	   is	   argued,	   free	   up	   resources	   for	   mitigation	   investments	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	  involve	  no	  net	  cost.	  To	  see	  how	  this	  is	  expected	  to	  work	  we	  can	  first	  look	  at	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  we	  save.	  	  	  Each	  generation	  passes	  on	  savings	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  by	   leaving	  natural	  resources	  and	  by	   investing	   in	   things	   like	   infrastructure,	   technology,	  and	  knowledge	   that	  pass	  on	  productive	  capacity	  to	  future	  generations.	  However,	  because	  the	  true	  social	  costs	  of	  GHG	  intensive	  consumption	  and	  investment	  choices	  are	  not	  internalised	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  current	  generation	  is	  actually	  saving	  for	  future	  generations	  in	  a	  very	  inefficient	  way.	  We	  could	   save	   for	   the	   future	   in	   a	   much	   more	   efficient	   way	   by	   shifting	   some	   current	  investment	  away	   from	  conventional	   capital	   and	   into	  mitigation	  capital,	   i.e.	   low-­‐carbon	  energy,	  low-­‐carbon	  infrastructures,	  and	  efficiency.	  By	  investing	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  dangerous	  levels	  of	  global	  warming	  much	  more	  welfare	  is	  ‘passed	  on’	  to	  future	  generations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  avoided	  climate	  damages	  than	  would	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  them	  in	  the	  form	  of	  conventional	  productive	  capacity.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  composition	  of	   the	   current	   generation’s	   future	   oriented	   investments	   can	   leave	   consumption	   levels	  constant.	   	   This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   second	   issue,	   changes	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   our	  consumption.	  	  The	   aim	   is	   to	   bring	   about	   an	   intergenerationally	   optimal	   level	   of	   investment	   in	  mitigation	   capital	   and	   an	   intergenerationally	   optimal	   shift	   away	   from	   GHG	   intensive	  consumption	  without	  affecting	  (too	  much)	  the	  value	  of	  lifetime	  consumption	  bundles	  for	  present	   people.	   In	   economic	   theory	   this	   is	   ideally	   achieved	   by	   the	   imposition	   of	   an	  optimal	  cost	  for	  GHG	  emissions.	  Compensating	  the	  present	  for	  making	  the	  consumption	  of	   GHG	   intensive	   goods	   more	   expensive	   can	   be	   achieved,	   it	   is	   argued,	   by	   consuming	  more	  goods	  that	  are	  not	  GHG	  intensive.	  Eating	  meat	  and	  other	  animal	  based	  foods	  can	  be	   compensated	  with	   eating	   less	   expensive	   and	   higher	   quality	   vegetable	   based	   foods.	  Travel	  by	  car	  can	  be	  compensated	  with	   increased	   investment	   in	  public	   transportation.	  Buying	   less	   carbon	   intensive	   consumer	  products	  and	  going	  on	   few	  overseas	  vacations	  can	  be	  compensated	  by	  consuming	  more	  services	  and	  working	  less.	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Of	   course	   the	   substitutions	   noted	   above	   are	   all	   already	   available	   to	   us	   and	   are	   not	  currently	  chosen	  to	  nearly	  a	  sufficient	  extent.	  The	  mitigation	  without	  sacrifice	  proposal	  cannot	   simply	   be	   that	   current	   agents	   should	   change	   their	   preferences.	   This	   is	   not	  because	   there	   are	   necessarily	   few	   opportunities	   for	   existing	   agents	   to	   change	   their	  preferences.	  Instead	  the	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  proposal	  aims	  to	  show	  that	  even	  if	  we	  depart	  from	  the	  pessimistic	  premises	  that	  i)	  existing	  agents	  are	  only	  willing	  to	  make	  modest	  sacrifices	  for	  the	  future	  and	  ii)	  that	  we	  can	  only	  expect	  existing	  agents	  to	  alter	  their	  preferences	  marginally,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  compensate	  these	  agents	  for	  investing	  in	  avoiding	  future	  climate	  damage.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  argument	  has	  to	  be	  that	  there	  is	  some	  increase	  in	  alternative	  consumption	  patterns	  that	  the	  current	  generation	  prefers	  more	  than	  or	  at	  least	  as	  strongly	  as	  its	  current	  emissions	  intensive	  economy.	  	  If	   we	   impose	   an	   intergenerationally	   optimal	   carbon	   tax	   the	   costs	   of	   consuming	  emissions	   intensive	   goods	   are	   increased	   and	   the	   returns	   on	   emissions	   intensive	  investments	   are	   decreased.	   The	   results	   are	   reductions	   in	   lifetime	   consumption	   as	   a	  direct	   response	   to	   cost	   increases	   and	   reductions	   in	   consumption	   as	   consequence	   of	  reductions	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  economic	  growth	  over	  existing	  agents’	  lifetimes	  compared	  to	  a	  business	   as	   usual	   (BAU)	   investment	   scenario.	   We	   can	   in	   part	   compensate	   for	   these	  losses	   by	   redistributing	   emissions	   taxes	   back	   to	   citizens	   and	   in	   part	   by	   taking	   on	  national	  debt	  (Foley,	  2009).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  borrowing	  is	  to	  give	  the	  current	  generation	  enough	   of	   an	   alternative	   lifetime	   consumption	   bundle	   to	   make	   it	   worth	   its	   while	   to	  accept	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  carbon	  tax.	  To	  illustrate	  how	  this	  debt	  financing	  is	  expected	  to	  amount	  to	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  we	  can	  set	  up	  this	  borrowing	  via	  a	  pay-­‐as-­‐you	  go	  pension	  system.	  	  	  Let	   us	   say	   that	   in	   the	   current	   pension	   system	   workers	   pay	   for	   retirees’	   pensions	   by	  transferring	   5%	   of	   their	   earnings	   (i.e.	   productivity)	   into	   the	   scheme.	   Workers	   are	  motivated	   to	  make	   such	   transfers	   because	   they	   expect	   their	   children	   to	   pay	   for	   their	  pensions	   when	   they	   themselves	   retire.	   This	   allows	   workers	   to	   spread	   out	   their	  consumption	  between	  their	  productive	  and	  non-­‐productive	  years	  and	  to	  save	  in	  a	  way	  that	   gives	   them	  access	   to	   some	  of	   the	  gains	  of	   economic	  growth	   in	   the	  economy.	  This	  same	  reasoning	  will	  hold	  for	  the	  worker’s	  children	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  system	  of	  saving	  is	  a	  form	   of	   indirect	   reciprocity	   where	   the	   working	   generation	   confers	   a	   benefit	   on	   the	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retired	   generation	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   future	   benefit	   from	   the	   young	   generation.	   This	  system	  of	  reciprocity	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  altruism,	  does	  not	  have	  a	  determinate	  endpoint,	  and	  users	  expect	   it	   to	  reach	  far	  out	   into	  the	   future	  (Heath,	  2013).	  To	  borrow	  from	  the	  future	   workers	   are	   asked	   to	   dedicate	   an	   additional	   1%	   of	   their	   productivity	   to	  investment	   in	  mitigation	   capital.	   As	   compensation	   the	  workers’	   children	  will	   increase	  the	  size	  of	  the	  transfers	  they	  make	  to	  retirees	  when	  they	  themselves	  become	  workers.	  Our	  children	  will	  in	  turn	  be	  compensated	  when	  they	  retire	  by	  their	  children.	  When	  the	  benefits	   of	   avoided	   climate	   change	   begin	   to	   arrive	   workers	   can	   begin	   to	   reduce	   the	  amount	  of	  compensation	  they	  give	  to	  retirees.	  	  Retirees	  are	  now	  being	  compensated	  for	  their	  payments	  into	  the	  pension	  system	  both	  in	  the	   form	   of	   transfers	   from	   workers	   and	   in	   the	   form	   of	   avoided	   climate	   damages.	  Subsequent	  cohorts	  of	  workers	  should	  also	  expect	  to	  receive	  less	  than	  they	  paid	  into	  the	  pension	   system.	   These	   decreases	   in	   the	   size	   of	   the	   transfers	   made	   from	   workers	   to	  retirees	  can	  continue	  until	  the	  point	  at	  which	  a	  cohort	  of	  workers	  secures	  a	  net	  benefit	  over	  its	  lifetime	  from	  any	  investments	  they	  make	  in	  mitigation	  capital.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  in	  time	  when	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  problem	  of	  motivating	  these	  types	  of	  investments.	  In	  theory,	   there	  can	  be	  a	   stopping	  point	   for	   transferring	   the	   costs	  of	  mitigation	   to	   future	  generations	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	  mitigation	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   extend	  very	   far	   into	   the	   future.4	  This	   looks	   like	   a	   clear	  method	   for	   taking	   on	   debt	   to	   finance	  investment	  in	  mitigation	  and	  effectively	  transferring	  the	  costs	  into	  the	  future.	  
IV	  -­‐	  THE	  DIFFICULTIES	  OF	  COMPENSATING	  THE	  PRESENT	  Changing	   the	  way	  we	  save	   for	   future	  generations	  only	  appears	   to	  be	  able	   to	   solve	   the	  problem	   of	   motivating	   the	   current	   generation	   in	   the	   straightforward	   way	   described	  above	   if	   current	   savings	   actually	   aim	   at	   passing	   on	   wealth	   to	   future	   generations.	  However,	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   the	   intergenerational	   savings	   effect	   of	   investments	   in	   the	  conventional	   capital	   stock	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   by-­‐product	   rather	   than	   the	   aim	   of	   these	  investments.	  Savers	  save	  to	  distribute	  their	  consumption	  over	  both	  the	  productive	  and	  unproductive	  years	  of	  their	  lives,	  to	  secure	  some	  of	  the	  gains	  of	  economic	  growth,	  and	  to	  pass	   on	   some	   wealth	   to	   their	   immediate	   descendants.	   Borrowers	   borrow	   to	   make	  productive	   investments	   that	  will	   bring	   them	   returns	   that	   are	  more	   valuable	   than	   the	  cost	  of	  borrowing.	  When	  the	  government	  borrows	  to	  invest	  in	  things	  like	  infrastructure,	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education,	   and	   healthcare	   the	   timeframes	   for	   returns	   are	   longer	   than	   for	   private	  investors.	  Still,	  if	  the	  government	  borrows	  to	  build	  a	  hospital,	  a	  university,	  or	  new	  roads	  the	  main	  aims	  are	  to	  use	  these	  goods	  now	  and	  to	  produce	  economic	  growth	  that	  will	  be	  beneficial	  in	  some	  way	  to	  taxpayers	  and	  their	  children.	  	  The	  claim	  is	  not	  of	  course	  that	  the	  present’s	  investments	  are	  in	  no	  way	  aimed	  towards	  the	   interests	   of	   future	   people.	   Those	  who	   engage	   in	   basic	   research	  may	   in	   part	   do	   so	  because	  it	  represents	  a	  good	  career	  for	  them.	  Individuals	  and	  society	  may	  invest	  in	  such	  research	  because	  it	  is	  valued	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  However,	  if	  there	  were	  no	  prospect	  of	  this	  research	   doing	   some	   good	   in	   the	   future	   we	   would	   surely	   invest	   much	   less.	   This	   is	  especially	  true	  for	  areas	  such	  as	  cancer	  research,	  but	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  general	  feature	  of	  our	  interests	  in	  the	  future	  (Scheffler,	  2013,	  p.	  24).	  A	  real	  concern	  for	  the	  future	  must	  play	  some	  part	  in	  explaining	  why	  we	  sometimes	  invest	  in	  infrastructure	  designed	  to	  last	  for	   many	   generations.	   Taking	   resources	   away	   from	   things	   like	   cancer	   research	   or	  designing	  hundred	  year	  bridges	  and	  re-­‐directing	  them	  towards	  mitigation	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  a	   more	   effective	   way	   of	   investing	   in	   the	   future.	   However,	   the	   large	   majority	   of	  investments	  in	  capital	  aim	  at	  benefiting	  the	  present	  even	  though	  they	  also	  often	  benefit	  the	  future	  as	  a	  bi-­‐product.	  Thus,	  asking	  the	  current	  generation	  to	  shift	  its	  investments	  in	  conventional	  capital	  towards	  mitigation	  capital	  is	  for	  the	  most	  part	  not	  a	  cost-­‐free	  way	  for	  the	  present	  to	  produce	  better	  returns	  far	  off	  into	  the	  future.	  Rather,	  a	  motivationally	  challenged	   present	   needs	   to	   be	   compensated	   for	   not	   making	   the	   investments	   they	  currently	  make	  for	  more	  self-­‐interested	  reasons.	  	  	  If	   we	   go	   back	   to	   our	   pension	   scheme,	   it	   should	   now	   be	   clear	   that	   if	   current	  workers	  dedicate	  and	  extra	  1%	  of	  their	  productivity	  to	  mitigation	  receiving	  an	  extra	  1%	  of	  our	  children’s	  productivity	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  compensate	  us	  in	  a	  sacrifice	  free	  way.	  From	  the	  perspective	   of	   current	   workers	   and	   their	   children	   the	   value	   of	   their	   lifetime	  consumption	  bundles	   is	   greater	   in	   the	  BAU	  scenario	   compared	   to	   a	   scenario	   in	  which	  investments	   are	   shifted	   from	   conventional	   capital	   to	  mitigation	   capital.	   Resources	   are	  directed	   away	   from	   the	   types	   of	   consumption	   and	   investments	   that	   produce	   the	   best	  economic	  outcomes	  over	  the	  period	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  current	  workers.	  When	  current	  workers	  become	  pensioners	  they	  need	  to	  be	  compensated	  for	  the	  effect	  this	  decrease	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  growth	  will	  have	  on	  the	  size	  of	  transfers	  into	  the	  pension	  system	  compared	  to	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BAU.	   This	  means	   that	   our	   children	  will	   have	   to	   dedicate	   a	   larger	   percentage	   of	   their	  productivity	  into	  to	  the	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  pension	  system	  than	  we	  did.	  This	  is	  only	  the	  first	  way	  in	  which	  reaching	  the	  no-­‐sacrifice	  level	  is	  more	  difficult	  than	  it	  may	  at	  first	  seem.	  	  Think	  of	  an	  economy	  that	  consists	  of	  a	  smoker	  and	  a	  room	  filled	  with	  asthmatics.	  The	  smoker	  internalises	  the	  benefits	  of	  smoking	  and	  externalises	  the	  costs.	  The	  asthmatics’	  lives	  are	  made	  almost	  unbearable	  by	  the	  suffering	  the	  second-­‐hand	  smoke	  causes	  them.	  These	  social	  costs	  of	  smoking	  are	  much	  greater	   than	  the	  personal	  benefits	   the	  smoker	  enjoys.	  Let	  us	  suppose	  that	  the	  smoker	  is	  not	  moved	  by	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  asthmatics	  and	  that	  the	  only	  available	  option	  to	  eliminate	  the	  negative	  externality	  in	  this	  economy	  is	  for	  the	  asthmatics	   to	  compensate	   the	  smoker	   for	  quitting.	  He	  must	  be	  compensated	   to	  an	  extent	   that	   at	   least	  matches	   the	   benefits	   he	   enjoys	   from	   smoking.	   If	   the	   smoker	   quits	  smoking	   the	   asthmatics	   will	   become	   amazingly	   ‘welfare	   rich’	   compared	   to	   current	  conditions.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  free	  up	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  compensate	  the	  smoker.	   The	   asthmatics	   become	   rich	   in	   the	   form	   of	   avoided	   asthma	   attacks.	   By	  assumption	  the	  value	  of	  this	  form	  of	  wealth	  is	  extremely	  low	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  smoker.	  If	  the	  asthmatics	  are	  poor	  in	  other	  types	  of	  goods	  while	  the	  smoker	  has	  a	  very	  strong	  preference	  for	  smoking,	  a	  transfer	  to	  compensate	  the	  smoker	  for	  quitting	  will	  not	  be	  possible.	  	  	  For	  a	  social	  planner	  trying	  to	  maximize	  welfare	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  that	  permitting	  smoking	  in	  this	  economy	  is	  very	  inefficient.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  how	  economists	  conceive	  of	  the	  way	  a	  negative	  externality	  can	  create	  inefficiency	  in	  a	  market	  that	  can	  be	  eliminated	  by	  a	  transfer	  that	  leaves	  no	  party	  worse	  off.	  Instead	  we	  have	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  smoking	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  smoker’s	  willingness	  to	  be	  compensated	  for	  not	  smoking.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  social	  benefit	  of	  smoking	  a	  cigarette	  is	  determined	  by	  how	  much	  we	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  smoker	  so	  that	  he	  would	  be	  at	  least	  indifferent	  between	  the	  options	  of	  smoking	  the	   cigarette	   or	   taking	   the	   payment.	   The	   social	   cost	   of	   smoking	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	  asthmatics	  willingness	  to	  pay	  to	  prevent	  smoking.	  When	  some	  agents’	  willingness	  to	  pay	  to	  avoid	  a	  negative	  externality	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  amount	  necessary	  to	  pay	  some	  other	  agents	   to	   refrain	   from	   creating	   this	   externality	   there	   is	   inefficiency	   in	   the	   market.	   A	  transfer	   from	   the	   negative	   externality	   takers	   to	   the	   externality	   producers	   generates	   a	  more	   efficient	   market	   outcome	   (Kelleher	   2015,	   71-­‐73).	   In	   the	   smoking	   case	   I	   have	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described	   we	   can	   assume	   that	   the	   asthmatics’	   willingness	   to	   pay	   is	   greater	   than	   the	  smoker’s	  willingness	  to	  be	  compensated.	  However,	  the	  point	  to	  notice	  is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  have	   a	   large	   negative	   externality	   that	   is	  massively	   inefficient	   with	   respect	   to	   welfare	  outcomes	  it	  can	  also	  be	  true	  that	  there	  is	  no	  possible	  transfer	  between	  agents	  that	  could	  diminish	   the	   externality	   while	   each	   agent	   remains,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   on	   their	   Pareto	  indifference	  curve.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  externality	  reducing	  transfer	  will	  be	  possible	  is	   dependent	   on	   the	   pollutees	   having	   access	   to	   goods	   that	   are	   candidates	   for	   transfer	  because	  they	  satisfy	  the	  polluters’	  willingness	  to	  be	  compensated.	  	  	  	  Once	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   present	   appears	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   be	  compensated	  with	  to	  stop	  consuming	  GHG	  intensive	  goods	  it	  becomes	  clearer	  how	  large	  this	  alternative	  bundle	  of	  resources	  may	  have	  to	  be.	  What	   is	  at	   issue	   is	   the	  core	  of	   the	  current	   generation’s	   consumption	   preferences	   and	   productive	   capacity.	   For	   example,	  effective	   climate	   mitigation	   may	   require	   moving	   largely	   to	   a	   vegetarian	   diet.	   The	  resources	  necessary	   to	  make	  such	  a	   transition	  are	  negative.	  Production	  of	  plant-­‐based	  foods	  requires	   fewer	  resources	   than	   the	  production	  of	  meat.	  Small	   reductions	   in	  meat	  consumption	  are	  surely	  easy	  to	  compensate,	  but	  if	  we	  are	  aiming	  to	  compensate	  without	  having	  to	  wait	  for	  people	  to	  change	  their	  preferences	  (which	  is	  what	  the	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  proposal	  aims	  for)	  at	  some	  point	  the	  marginal	  willingness	  to	  be	  compensated	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  eat	  meat	  will	  become	  very	  low.	  Likewise,	  it	  may	  only	  take	  an	  annual	  investment	  of	  1%	  of	  gross	  world	  product	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change.	  However,	  getting	  to	  the	   no-­‐sacrifice	   level	   may	   require	   a	   very	   large	   bundle	   of	   alternative	   resources	   to	  compensate	   the	   current	   generation	   for	   not	   being	   able	   to	   exploit	   emission	   intensive	  goods	  they	  have	  strong	  demonstrated	  preferences	  for.	  	  	  The	   upshot	   is	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   compensating	   for	   differences	   in	   economic	   growth	  compared	  to	  BAU	  our	  children	  will	  also	  have	  to	  dedicate	  even	  more	  of	  their	  productive	  capacity	   to	   the	  pay-­‐as-­‐you-­‐go	  pension	  scheme	   to	  make	   it	  worth	   the	  present’s	  while	   to	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  its	  consumption	  bundles.	  Also	  note	  that	  the	  system	  calls	  for	  us	   to	  shift	  more	  of	  our	  consumption	   from	  our	  productive	  years	   to	  our	  non-­‐productive	  years	  than	  we	  would	  normally	  choose	  to	  do.	  This	   is	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  and	  has	  to	  be	  compensated	  by	  more	  consumption	  in	  our	  non-­‐productive	  years	  than	  we	  forwent	  in	  our	  productive	  years.	  This	  is	  a	  third	  additional	  cost	  that	  results	  in	  still	  greater	  shares	  of	  our	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children’s	   productivity	   going	   into	   the	   pension	   system.	   Our	   children’s	   children	   will	   in	  their	   turn	   have	   to	   dedicate	   even	   larger	   portions	   of	   their	   productivity	   to	   their	   parents	  than	  they	  did	  for	  us.	  	  	  The	  point	   is	  not	  to	  suggest	   that	   it	   is	  more	  expensive	  than	  we	  think	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change.	   Nor	   is	   the	   concern	   that	   there	   must	   necessarily	   be	   a	   very	   low	   elasticity	   of	  demand	  for	  GHG	  intensive	  goods	  that	  will	  make	  GHG	  emissions	  prices	  less	  effective	  than	  expected.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  even	  if	  emissions	  taxes	  effectively	  bring	  about	  desired	  shifts	  in	   consumption	   and	   investments	   it	   looks	   like	   it	   is	   more	   expensive	   than	   we	   think	   to	  compensate	   the	   current	   generation	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	  do	  not	   view	   these	   taxes	   as	  generating	   important	   sacrifices.	   It	   looks	   more	   difficult	   than	   expected	   to	   solve	   the	  problem	  of	  motivating	  agents	   to	  adopt	  effective	  carbon	   taxes	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  This	   is	  important	  because	  of	  limits	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  debt	  financing	  countries	  can	  engage	  in.	  	  The	  typical	  story	  about	  limits	  to	  deficit	  spending	  is	  that	  the	  more	  debt	  a	  country	  has	  the	  more	   tax	   revenue	   they	  have	   to	  dedicate	   to	   servicing	   the	  debt,	  which	   raises	   the	   risk	  of	  default,	  which	  raises	  the	  interests	  rates	  at	  which	  governments	  can	  borrow,	  which	  in	  turn	  increases	   the	   revenue	   necessary	   to	   service	   the	   debt,	   which	   eventually	   makes	   further	  borrowing	  too	  costly.	  Given	  limits	  to	  how	  much	  debt	  governments	  can	  take	  on,	  whatever	  the	   mechanisms,	   it	   seems	   to	   follow	   that	   a	   generation	   that	   is	   unwilling	   to	   take	   on	  significant	  sacrifices	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change	  is	  also	  going	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  using	  debt	  financing	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  more	  present	  oriented	  goods	  rather	  than	  more	  future	  oriented	  goods.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  an	  opportunity	  cost	  here	  that	  looks	  like	  it	  is	   very	   difficult	   to	   compensate.	   Given	   that	   the	   present	   needs	   to	   be	   compensated	   for	  shifting	   its	   investment	   patterns,	   changing	   its	   consumption	   bundles,	   changing	   its	  consumption	   timing,	   and	   for	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   of	   dedicating	   scarce	   access	   to	   debt	  financing	   to	   future	   oriented	   investments	   it	   should	   no	   longer	   be	   surprising	   that	   the	  current	   generation	   does	   not	   use	   debt	   financing	   to	   a	   substantial	   extent	   to	   invest	   in	  climate	   change	   mitigation.	   This	   is	   especially	   true	   given	   the	   magnitude	   of	   mitigation	  investments	  needed	  in	  comparison	  to	  existing	  deficit	  levels.	  	  Net	  government	  deficits	  for	  the	  OECD	  countries	  in	  2013	  were	  2.1	  trillion	  US	  $.5	  	  In	  order	  to	  get	  onto	  a	  2°C	  trajectory	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  is	  calling	  for	  investment	  in	  
	   14	  
addition	  to	  those	  needed	  simply	  to	  meet	  future	  energy	  demand	  of	  on	  average	  1	  trillion	  US	   $	   per	   year	   to	   2035	   (International	   Energy	   Agency,	   2014:	   44).	   Rogelj	   et	   al.	   (2013)	  estimate	  that	  an	  immediate	  global	  price	  on	  GHG	  emissions	  of	  US$40	  tCO2e,	  rising	  there	  after,	  would	  give	  us	  a	  66%	  chance	  of	  keeping	  warming	  to	  2°C.	  Global	  GHG	  emissions	  in	  2011	  were	  over	  43	  000	  MtCO2e.6	  	  This	  gives	  us	  over	  1.7	  trillion	  US$	  in	  new	  costs.	  The	  co-­‐benefits	  from	  such	  mitigation	  investments	  may	  be	  very	  large	  over	  the	  longer-­‐term,	  while	  cost	   estimates	   may	   also	   be	   overly	   optimistic	   due	   to	   assumptions	   of	   full	   global	  cooperation	  and	  perfect	  policy	   implementation.	  There	   is	  obviously	  a	   lot	  of	  uncertainty	  about	  costs,	  but	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  meeting	  these	  costs	  through	  debt	  financing	  involves	  extremely	  large	  shifts	  in	  how	  resources	  are	  being	  used	  compared	  to	  current	  patterns.	  	  
V	  -­‐	  EXPLOITING	  TYRANNY	  OVER	  THE	  FUTURE	  FOR	  THE	  GOOD	  The	  combination	  of	  limits	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  to	  take	  on	  debt,	  incentives	  to	  use	  debt	   for	  present	  oriented	  goods,	  preferences	   for	  GHG	   intensive	  goods	  over	  alternative	  packages	  of	  goods,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  investment	  in	  capital	  that	  largely	  aims	  at	  producing	  returns	  over	  the	  nearer	  term	  should	  make	  us	  question	  how	  big	  of	  a	  role	  borrowing	  from	  the	   future	   can	   play	   in	   addressing	   motivational	   obstacles	   to	   investing	   in	   mitigation	  capital.	   If	   this	   assessment	   is	   plausible	   we	   are	   back	   where	   we	   started.	  We	   see	   strong	  incentives	   for	   delaying	  mitigation	   investments	   and	   as	   a	   result	   it	   may	   be	   strategically	  important	  to	  identify	  ways	  of	  shifting	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  to	  avoid	  dangerous	  levels	  of	  global	  warming.	  	  In	  one	  sense	  ‘passing	  the	  buck’	  to	  the	  future	  has	  been	  a	  key	  strategy	  in	  climate	  politics	  for	  several	  decades.	  The	  1997	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  is	  regularly	  derided	  as	  having	  had	  far	  too	  weak	   commitments,	   covering	   far	   too	   little	   of	   global	   emissions,	   and	   as	   having	   been	  ineffective	  in	  brining	  about	  emissions	  reductions	  that	  would	  not	  have	  occurred	  for	  other	  reasons.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  widely	  understood	  that	  the	  protocol	  was	  weakly	  demanding	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  broad	  international	  participation	  and	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  set	  up	  the	  institutional	  mechanisms	  for	  carbon	  trading	  and	  other	  flexibility	  mechanisms.	  The	  aim	  was	   to	   extend	   the	   regime	   in	   subsequent	   commitment	   periods	   with	   deeper	   reduction	  targets	  and	  more	  effective	   institutional	  mechanisms.	  This	  did	  not	  occur	  as	  envisioned,	  but	   the	   push	  within	   the	  UNFCCC	  process	   for	  more	   ambitious	   emissions	   commitments	  and	   expanded	   coverage	   continues.	   In	   the	  EU	  Emissions	  Trading	   System’s	   (ETS)	   initial	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trading	   period	   between	   2005-­‐2007	   the	  market	  was	   characterised	   by	  weak	   emissions	  targets,	   an	   over-­‐allocation	   of	   free	   emissions	   allowances,	   and	   significant	   national	  flexibility	   in	  meeting	   targets	   (Parker,	  2011).	   Increased	  ambition	  and	  harmonisation	  of	  rules	  across	  EU	  member	  states,	  especially	   for	   the	   third	   trading	  period	  2013-­‐2020,	  has	  followed.	   However	   “temporary	   exemptions,	   compensations	   and	   procrastination	   of	  decisions”	  still	  create	  delays	  between	  decisions	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  costs	  with	  these	  delays	  designed	  to	  help	  secure	  agreement	  (Muller	  &	  Slominski,	  2013:	  1437).	  For	  example,	  the	  full	  shift	  in	  the	  third	  trading	  period	  to	  auctioning	  of	  emission	  credits	  will	  not	  be	  in	  place	  until	  2027,	  while	  sectors	  deemed	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  significant	  carbon	  leakage	  will	  have	  access	  to	  free	  allowances	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  compensation.7	  	  	  Creating	  temporal	  space	  between	  when	  policy	  makers	  adopt	  at	  decision	  and	  when	  the	  costs	   arrive,	   working	  with	   shorter-­‐term	   flexibility	   and	   longer-­‐term	   pre-­‐commitments,	  and	   setting	   in	   motion	   path	   dependencies	   are	   all	   highlighted	   in	   the	   political	   science	  literature	  as	  important	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  with	  so-­‐called	  ‘super	  wicked’	  cooperation	  problems	   (e.g.	   Lazurus,	   2009,	   Ismer	   &	   Neuhoff,	   2009,	   Levin	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   Urpelainen,	  2012,	   Brunner	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   Jordan	   &	   Matt,	   2014).	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   types	   of	  policies	   involve	   weak	   initial	   demands	   they	   do	   not	   respond	   to	   the	   urgency	   of	   the	  environmental	  threat.	  This	  is	  regularly	  and	  rightly	  criticised,	  but	  it	  should	  also	  be	  clear	  that	  such	  policies	  are	  often	  genuine	  strategic	   responses	   to	  real	  political	  obstacles.	  The	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  proposal	  aims	  to	  offer	  a	  better	  strategy	  than	  incrementalism	  by	  shifting	  costs	  to	  the	  future	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  eliminating	  procrastination.	  I	  have	  raised	  doubts	   that	   this	  approach	   is	  a	  powerful	   tool	   for	  mediating	   the	  politics	  of	  delay.	  The	   structure	  of	   the	  problem	  suggests	   that	  we	  need	   to	   identify	  ways	   to	   set	   in	  motion	  serious	  mitigation	  efforts	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	  not	  require	   large	  changes	   in	  behaviour	  right	  now.	  	  	  	  	  	  For	   example,	   those	   in	   political	   power	   now	   could	   commit	   the	   young	   to	   significant	  investments	   in	  mitigation.	   Designing	   these	   commitments	   so	   that	   they	   create	   a	   future	  financial	   liability	   for	   failures	   to	   make	   promised	   investments	   would	   exploit	   future	  decision	   makers’	   commitments	   to	   property	   rights	   regimes	   and	   the	   global	   financial	  system.	  Potential	  financial	  liabilities	  for	  failing	  to	  invest	  in	  mitigation	  would	  be	  a	  means	  to	   entrench	   mitigation	   commitments	   imposed	   by	   present	   governments	   onto	   future	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governments.8	  The	  only	  proposal	  along	  these	  lines	  I	  have	  been	  able	  to	  identify	  is	  the	  idea	  of	   governments	   issuing	   index-­‐linked	   policy	   performance	   bonds	   where	   interest	  payments	  on	  the	  bonds	  are	  linked	  to	  GHG	  emission	  targets	  or	  financing	  targets	  for	  low-­‐carbon	  energy.	  If	  the	  government	  fails	  to	  meet	  its	  mitigation	  targets	  there	  is	  a	  penalty	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  interest	  rates	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  bond	  holders	  (Ekins	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  168-­‐170).	  However,	   governments	   have	   to	   already	   be	   committed	   to	   increasing	   the	   resources	  dedicated	   to	   cutting	   GHG	   emissions	   to	   pre-­‐commit	   themselves	   in	   this	  way.	  What	   I	   am	  imagining	  is	  a	  policy	  that	  largely	  pre-­‐commits	  future	  governments	  and	  thus	  places	  some	  temporal	   space	   between	   when	   the	   pre-­‐commitment	   is	   made	   and	   when	   governments	  have	   to	   start	   making	   the	   mitigation	   investments.	   I	   have	   not	   been	   able	   to	   identify	  thinking	   in	   the	   economics	   literature	   that	  would	   specifically	  meet	   the	   criteria	   outlined	  above.	  As	  a	  result	   I	  am	  only	  able	   to	  briefly	  suggest	  a	  type	  of	  proposal	   that	  attempts	   to	  enforce	  commitments	  made	  today	  on	  future	  governments	  by	  creating	  a	  financial	  liability	  today	  that	  will	  materialise	  tomorrow	  if	  governments	  fail	  to	  mitigate.	  	  The	   aim	   of	   the	   pre-­‐commitment	   proposal	   suggested	   above	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   level	   of	  bootstrapping	  involved	  in	  the	  more	  incrementalist	  approaches	  we	  currently	  have	  while	  at	   the	   same	   time	   taking	   seriously	   the	  possibility	   that	  governments	  will	   continue	   to	  be	  very	  wary	   about	   binding	   themselves	   to	   strong	   financial	   commitments	   over	   the	   short-­‐term.	   The	   type	   of	   proposal	   under	   consideration	   is	   clearly	   flawed	   in	   that	   it	   does	   not	  respond	   quickly	   enough	   to	   the	   environmental	   threat.	   Thus,	   it	   should	   be	   understood	  chiefly	   as	   an	   insurance	   policy	   against	   the	   risk	   of	   an	   intergenerational	   pattern	   of	  perpetual	   delay.9	  Because	   I	   cannot	   provide	   a	   design	   for	   the	   strategy	   proposed	   above,	  this	  chapter	  is	  limited	  to	  assessing	  the	  normative	  case	  for	  this	  more	  explicit	  form	  of	  pre-­‐committing	   the	   future.	   The	   purpose	   of	   such	   an	   assessment	   is	   to	   give	   some	  normative	  permission	  to	  think	  about	  new	  creative	  ways	  of	  pre-­‐committing	  future	  publics	  that	  can	  better	  mediate	  the	  wickedness	  of	  time	  in	  the	  Anthropocene.	  	  	  If	  our	  parents	  had	  committed	  us	  to	  financial	  liabilities	  for	  failing	  to	  invest	  in	  mitigation	  could	   we	   plausibly	   argue	   that	   we	   did	   not	   deserve	   this	   type	   of	   treatment?	   The	   more	  unjustifiable	   it	   appears	   to	   be	   for	   us	   to	   simply	   fail	   to	  mitigate	   climate	   change	   and	   the	  longer	  we	  delay	  serious	  action,	  the	  less	  plausible	  it	  is	  to	  question	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  justifiable	   for	   past	   generations	   to	   bind	   us	   to	   mitigation	   investments.	   If	   we	   deserve	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paternalistic	   treatment	   for	   our	   unwillingness	   and	   political	   incapacity	   to	   make	  meaningful	  investments	  in	  mitigation	  then	  so	  may	  our	  children.	  We	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  expect	   the	   next	   generation	   to	   do	   better	   than	   us	   from	   a	  moral	   perspective	   in	   various	  respects,	  but	  it	  is	  far	  from	  obvious	  that	  we	  should	  expect	  so	  much	  change	  that	  they	  will	  not	  also	  have	  very	   strong	   incentives	   to	  discount	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   future.	   	  Thus,	   the	  claim	   is	   not	   that	   the	   ways	   and	   extent	   to	   which	   people	   are	   motivated	   by	   moral	  considerations	  cannot	  change,	  but	  only	  that	  the	  incentives	  to	  discount	  the	  far	  future	  look	  particularly	   hard	   to	   change	   and	   that	   we	   should	   have	   some	   insurance	   against	   this	  problem.	  	  When	   current	   publics	   try	   to	   pre-­‐commit	   future	   publics	   the	   most	   common	   normative	  objection	  is	  that	  this	  is	  a	  form	  of	  political	  domination	  over	  the	  future	  by	  the	  present.	  This	  concern	   is	  usually	   raised	  against	   the	   constitutional	   entrenchment	  of	   some	  substantive	  public	   policy	   by	   the	   current	   majority	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   limiting	   the	   ability	   of	   future	  majorities	   to	   make	   public	   policy	   in	   this	   same	   area.	   If	   the	   present	   is	   able	   to	  democratically	   determine	  what	   the	   right	   substantive	   policy	   is	   without	   such	   obstacles	  why	   should	   the	   future	   be	   denied	   this	   same	   democratic	   power?	   Given	   reasonable	  disagreement	  about	  politics	   it	   is	  problematic	   for	   the	  current	  public	   to	  paternalistically	  safeguard	  future	  publics	  from	  following	  their	  own	  majoritarian	  will.	  On	  what	  grounds	  do	  current	  majorities	  think	  they	  have	  better	  access	  to	  answers	  about	  the	  policies	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  adopted	   than	   future	  majorities	   (Waldron,	  1999,	  255-­‐282)?	   	  However	   the	   type	  of	  pre-­‐commitment	   I	   am	   proposing	   is	   not	   an	   effort	   to	   protect	   the	   future	   against	   itself.	  Instead,	   pre-­‐committing	   our	   children	   to	  mitigation	   investments	   is	   an	   effort	   to	   protect	  the	  further	  future	  from	  the	  near	  future.	  What	  we	  do	  is	  not	  to	  democratically	  adopt	  some	  measure	  for	  ourselves	  that	  we	  then	  think	  should	  be	  maintained	  in	  perpetuity.	  Rather	  we	  
fail	   to	  adopt	  some	  measure	   that	  we	  think	  ought	   to	  be	  put	   into	  practice	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  future	  generations	  and	  instead	  pass	  on	  that	  commitment	  to	  the	  publics	  that	  will	  follow	  us.	   Surprisingly	   then,	   the	   combination	   of	   an	   unwillingness	   and	   inability	   to	   adopt	   just	  legislation	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   future	   generations	   that	   we	   are	   currently	  witnessing	   appears	   to	   significantly	   improve	   the	   justifiability	   of	   present	   majorities	  paternalistically	  pre-­‐committing	  future	  majorities.	  	  	  
	   18	  
The	  most	   serious	  objection	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  we	  should	  bind	  our	  children	   to	  mitigation	  costs	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  corruption.	  As	  Stephen	  Gardiner	  puts	  it,	  if	  the	  current	  generation	  favors	  buck-­‐passing,	  but	  does	  not	  want	  to	  face	  up	  to	  what	  it	  is	  doing,	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  welcome	  any	  rationale	  that	  appears	  to	  justify	  its	  behavior.	   Hence,	   it	   may	   be	   attracted	   to	   weak	   or	   deceptive	   arguments	   that	  appear	  to	  license	  buck-­‐passing,	  and	  so	  give	  them	  less	  scrutiny	  than	  it	  ought.	  	  It	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  obstacles	  to	  political	  action	  are	  particularly	  severe	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate	  change	  that	  makes	  buck-­‐passing	  in	  a	  safer	  way	  seem	  reasonable.	  How	  this	  claim	  is	  deployed	  in	  our	  moral	  evaluations	  is	  what	  warrants	  more	  scrutiny.	  	  Given	  the	  enormous	  amount	  of	  wealth	  and	  technological	  capability	  we	  currently	  enjoy	  it	  is	   not	   plausible	   to	   be	   sceptical	   about	   the	   prospects	   for	   action	   due	   to	   a	   sheer	   lack	   of	  capacity.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   the	   right	   kinds	   of	   motivations	   that	   prevents	   us	   from	  bringing	  the	  climate	  threat	  under	  effective	  political	  control.	  Binding	  our	  children	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  way	  for	  us	  to	   live	  up	  to	  our	  obligations	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  generations,	  albeit	  a	  very	  imperfect	  response.	  However,	  to	  make	  this	   move	   the	   present’s	   moral	   failure	   to	   act	   is	   actually	   conceived	   of	   as	   an	   external	  condition	   that	  existing	  agents	  must	   take	   into	  account	  as	  we	  decide	  how	  to	  protect	   the	  interests	  of	   the	   future.	   It	   looks	   like	   I	  have	  perverted	  our	  blatant	  discounting	  of	   future	  interests	   into	  a	  moral	   justification	   for	  passing	  on	   the	  costs	  of	  mitigation!	  What	   can	  be	  said	  in	  response	  to	  this	  charge?	  	  It	   is	   clearly	   moral	   suspicious	   to	   appeal	   to	   current	   political	   obstacles	   to	   justify	   cost	  shifting	  to	  the	  future.	  There	  is	  an	  incentive	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  obstacles	  one	  is	  complicit	  in	   creating	   because	   this	   provides	   moral	   cover	   for	   doing	   little	   now	   to	   address	   the	  problem.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  also	  problematic	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  present	  as	  a	  singular	  agent	  that	  can	  simply	  decide	  not	  to	  exploit	  some	  other	  agent,	  the	  future.	  Prohibitions	  on	  exploiting	   others	   agents	   are	   a	   basic	   feature	   of	   our	   normative	   theories	   and	   social	  institutions,	  and	  the	  message	  is	  that	  we	  need	  simply	  not	  to	  do	  what	  we	  normally	  expect	  agents	  not	  to	  do	  to	  each	  other.	  Yet,	  a	  generation	  is	  not	  a	  singular	  agent	  or	  any	  agent	  at	  all.	   Instead,	   what	   is	   required	   is	   to	   coordinate	   the	   actions	   of	   individuals,	   companies,	  communities,	  and	  governments	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  coordinate	  around	  is	  not	   some	  ubiquitous	   feature	  of	   common	   sense	  morality	  but	   something	  new.	  Agents	  must	   let	   the	  effects	  of	   their	  present	  actions	  on	  conditions	   far	   into	   the	   future	  outweigh	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their	   interests	   in	  securing	  goods	  here	  and	  now.	  We	  may	  have	  always	  depended	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  future	  generations	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  our	  projects	  (Scheffler,	  2013),	  but	  we	  have	  not	  had	  to	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  stark	  conflicts	  between	  many	  of	  our	  own	  unextraordinary	  projects	  and	  welfare	  in	  the	  distant	  future.	   	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  agents	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  protecting	  common	  pool	  resources	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate	  change	  these	  conditions	  are	  not	  satisfied	  (see	  Dietz	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Climate	  change	   is	   the	  most	  difficult	  cooperative	  challenge	  humanity	  has	   faced	  to	  date	  and	  as	  a	  result	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  second	  and	  third	  best	  options	  without	  being	  accused	  of	  blatant	  moral	  corruption.	  	  	  In	  response	   to	   long-­‐term	  threats	   like	  climate	  change	  political	   theorists	  often	  argue	   for	  institutional	  reforms	  that	  will	  eliminate	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  future.	  The	  most	  common	  proposals	  are	  to	  have	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  future	  represented	  in	  some	  way	  in	   the	   democratic	   process	   or	   to	   constitutionally	   entrench	   respect	   for	   the	   interests	   of	  future	  generations.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  address	  symptoms	  of	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  future	  it	  would	  be	  better,	  it	  is	  argued,	  to	  address	  the	  institutional	  sources	  of	  this	  injustice.	  However,	   it	  remains	  highly	  uncertain	   if	   institutional	  reforms	  of	   this	   type	  will	  go	  far	  enough	  fast	  enough	  to	  bring	  about	  effective	  mitigation	  policies.	  The	  argument	  of	  this	  section	  is	  that	  because	  we	  may	  have	  a	  limited	  window	  of	  opportunity	  to	  deal	  with	  the	   problem	   of	   weak	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   mitigation	   we	   should	   also	   consider	  strategies	  that	  attempt	  to	  exploit	  the	  present’s	  tyranny	  over	  the	  future	  for	  the	  good.	  	  	  	  The	  argument	  above	  has	  defended	   the	  paternalism	  of	  binding	   the	   future	   to	  mitigation	  costs.	   However,	   once	   a	   case	   for	   paternalism	   is	  made	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   ask	   if	   other	  forms	   of	   paternalism	   are	   preferable.	   For	   example,	   one	   could	   imagine	   more	   or	   less	  paternalistic	   government	  policies	   that	   attempt	   to	   change	  present	  people’s	  preferences	  so	   that	   they	   are	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	   interests	   of	   future	   generations.	   	   The	   argument	  advanced	   here	   clearly	   does	   not	   demonstrate	   which	   policy	   responses	   are	   all	   things	  considered	   the	   best	   ones.	   Much	   depends	   on	   how	   pessimistic	   we	   think	   we	   should	   be	  about	  current	  political	  conditions.	  The	  type	  of	  proposal	  I	  have	  advanced	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  insurance	  strategy	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  perpetual	  political	  inertia.	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CONCLUSION	  There	  is	  already	  some	  debt	  financing	  of	  mitigation	  investments	  and	  debt	  financing	  would	  surely	  be	  a	  large	  part	  of	  extensive	  government	  efforts	  to	  mitigate	  climate	  change.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  good	  strategic	  and	  normative	  case	  for	  passing	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  mitigation	  investments	  to	  the	  future.	  If	  the	  present	  has	  strong	  incentives	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  climate	  change	  to	  the	  future	  we	  should	  at	  least	  try	  to	  identify	  ways	  of	  passing	  on	  those	  costs	  in	  ways	  that	  best	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  generations.	  However,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  option	  to	  debt	  finance	  mitigation	  does	  not	  really	  resolve	  the	  basic	  problem	  of	  motivating	  agents	  to	  change	  their	  consumption	  and	  investment	  behaviours.	  	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  a	  ‘safer’	  way.	  Strategic	  buck-­‐passing	  and	  efforts	  to	  pre-­‐commit	  future	  publics	  to	  increasingly	  demanding	  mitigation	  efforts	  are	  also	  already	  a	  key	  part	  of	  climate	  governance.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  we	  should	  consider	  more	  explicit	  pre-­‐commitment	  strategies	  that	  bind	  the	  young	  today	  to	  large	  investments	  in	  mitigation	  over	  their	  productive	  lifetimes.	  If	  we	  are	  failing	  to	  overcome	  the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  future	  then	  we	  should	  consider	  how	  we	  might	  exploit	  that	  tyranny	  for	  the	  good.	  	  My	  argument	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  endorsement	  of	  the	  present’s	  domination	  over	  the	  future	  and	  it	  is	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  typical	  institutional	  reforms	  political	  theorists	  advance	  to	  reduce	  the	  present’s	  discounting	  of	  future	  interests.	  	  Yet,	  given	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  political	  challenges	  we	  currently	  face	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  global	  warming	  we	  should	  also	  be	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  may	  need	  stronger	  measures	  to	  prevent	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  we	  perpetually	  put	  off	  investing	  in	  climate	  security	  for	  the	  future.	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  thank	  Catriona	  McKinnon	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  in-­‐depth	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  that	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  me	  greatly	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  this	  chapter.	  Earlier	  versions	  of	  this	  chapter	  were	  presented	  during	  2014	  at	  the	  ECPR	  Joint	  Sessions,	  the	  Nordic	  Political	  Science	  Association	  Conference,	  The	  Academy	  of	  Finland’s	  Centre	  of	  Excellence	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences,	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  Governance	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  Department	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  University.	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  Dominic	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  Broome,	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  Huseby,	  Jonas	  Tallberg,	  Magnus	  Reitberg,	  Säde	  Hormio,	  Kian	  Mintz-­‐Woo,	  Simo	  Kyllönen,	  Jonathan	  Kuyper,	  Ludvig	  Beckman,	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  Göran	  Duus-­‐Otterström.	  I	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  also	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  Mehlenbacher,	  David	  von	  Below,	  and	  Nick	  Rowe	  for	  answering	  some	  basic	  questions	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future.	  	  2	  I	  remain	  agnostic	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  mitigation	  costs	  between	  generations	  would	  be.	  3	  This	  conclusion	  appears	  to	  be	  true	  even	  where	  agents	  are	  narrowly	  altruistic	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  strong	  preferences	  for	  securing	  high	  consumption	  levels	  for	  their	  children	  (Asheim,	  2013).	  4	  There	  is	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  one	  could	  plan	  to	  reduce	  pay-­‐outs	  to	  retirees	  without	  undermining	  the	  pension	  scheme.	  Workers	  facing	  the	  prospect	  that	  they	  will	  put	  more	  into	  the	  pension	  system	  that	  they	  get	  out	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  avoided	  climate	  damages	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  make	  up	  for	  this	  difference.	  As	  such	  they	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  decrease	  their	  inputs	  into	  the	  system	  to	  what	  they	  can	  expect	  to	  get	  out	  of	  it.	  This	  in	  turn	  gives	  cohorts	  prior	  to	  them	  incentives	  to	  pre-­‐emptively	  decrease	  their	  inputs	  into	  the	  system.	  This	  dynamic	  could	  undermine	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  scheme.	  Perpetually	  rolling	  over	  the	  debt	  could	  be	  a	  better	  way	  to	  ensure	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  scheme.	  Normatively	  assessing	  such	  a	  strategy	  would	  be	  dependent	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  distributive	  justice	  between	  generations.	  5	  By	  country	  GDP	  figures	  were	  taken	  from	  OECD	  (2014),	  "Gross	  domestic	  product	  in	  US	  dollars",	  Economics:	  Key	  Tables	  from	  OECD,	  No.	  5.	  DOI:	  10.1787/gdp-­‐cusd-­‐table-­‐2014-­‐5-­‐en.	  By	  country	  deficit	  figures	  were	  taken	  from	  OECD	  (2014),	  "Government	  deficit	  /	  surplus	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP",	  Economics:	  Key	  Tables	  from	  OECD,	  No.	  20.	  DOI:	  10.1787/gov-­‐dfct-­‐table-­‐2014-­‐1-­‐en.	  The	  calculation	  excludes	  Chile,	  Mexico	  and	  Turkey.	  	  6	  WRI,	  CAIT	  2.0.	  2014.	  Climate	  Analysis	  Indicators	  Tool:	  WRI’s	  Climate	  Data	  Explorer.	  Washington,	  DC:	  World	  Resources	  Institute.	  Available	  at:	  http://cait2.wri.org.	  Accessed	  October	  1,	  2014.	  	  7	  See	  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm	  .	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  8	  Ideally,	  the	  future	  holders	  of	  the	  corresponding	  financial	  entitlements	  would	  be	  those	  in	  poorer	  countries	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  climate	  change.	  These	  entitlements	  could	  thus	  serve	  as	  some	  level	  of	  compensation	  for	  failures	  to	  mitigate.	  However,	  one	  would	  also	  want	  agents	  holding	  rights	  to	  payment	  for	  ‘failure	  to	  perform’	  to	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  position	  to	  defend	  these	  entitlements.	  	  9	  Rendall	  (2011)	  also	  argues	  that	  borrowing	  from	  the	  future	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  insurance	  policy	  against	  a	  pattern	  of	  political	  inertia.	  	  
